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DISCOVERY AND PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
IN ADVERSARY AND NONADVERSARY
PROCEEDINGS
E. Allan Lind,* John Thibaut** & Laurens Walker***
I.

INTRODUCTION

one important respect, the judicial process is analogous to the
scientific method. Each must be seen by the public as objective
and rational, exhibiting procedures that combat bias and irrelevancy.
This analogy suggested to us that the capacity of the Anglo-American
adversary system1 to produce objective and rational decisions could
be empirically tested. Specifically, we devised an experiment in which
a series of planned variations in the judicial process was introduced
into a controlled setting. By comparing the measurable effects of
these changes, the variable that maximizes the quality of the decision
making may be identified. A similar research design was used in two
prior studies in which the decision maker was the center of interest.
The first investigated the ability of the adversary system to combat
decision maker bias; 2 the second examined decision maker bias caused
by the order of presentation at trial.3 The present study shifts attention to the attorney, and asks how attorney discovery and transmission of evidence affects another important potential source of bias:
the factual basis of a decision.
This investigation began, as did our first study, with the exami-
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• Graduate Student, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1970, University of Florida;
M.A. 1972, University of North Carolina.-Ed.
•• Professor of Psychology, University of North Carolina. A.B. 1939, University of
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... Professor of Law, University of North Carolina Law School. A.B. 1959, Davidson College; J.D. 1963, Duke University; S.J.D. 1970, Harvard University.-Ed.
The research reported in this article is a product of the project "Human Behavior
and the Legal Process," which is supported by National Science Foundation Grant
GS-28590X.
1. A general description of the adversary decision-making model is found in F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (1965); Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 34 (H. Berman ed. 1971); Joint Conf. on Professional Responsibility, Report,
44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958); and Davis & Foster, The Judicial Process and Social Change, in
SOCIETY AND nm LAw 95, 96-101 (F. Davis, et al. ed. 1962). A comparison with the inquisitorial system is made in Lacy, "Civilizing" Nonjury Trials, 19 VAND. L. R.Ev. 73
(1965) and Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe
and America, 48 HARV. L. R.Ev. 433 (1935). The leading critic of the adversary system was
Judge Jerome Frank. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102 (1949).
2. Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision Making, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972).
3. Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216
(1972).
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nation of a major advantage claimed on behalf of the Anglo-American adversary system: that attorneys in an adversary system provide
better discovery and transmission of information to legal decision
makers than do attorneys in an inquisitorial system.4 As one American legal theorist has written: "The adversary system presupposes
that the most effective means of determining truth is to place upon
a skilled advocate for each side the responsibility for investigating
and presenting the facts from a partisan perspective. Thus, the likelihood is maximized that all relevant facts will be ferreted out and
placed before the ultimate fact finder in as persuasive a manner as
possible." 5
A combination of two elements identifies the variations necessary
to evaluate the claim. The first element is the assignment of the
attorney's own role. In the Anglo-American adversary system he is
conditioned to be "client-centered."6 This conditioning is further
reinforced by contingent fees and attorney compensation based on
services rendered. 7 The second element is the attorney's perception
of his opponent's role. In the adversary system, the attorney understands that because his opponent is also client-centered by instruction
and incentive, the relationship of the two advocates is largely oppositional. These two elements can be easily altered to simulate the
other systems in order to test the claimed advantage. If the attorney's
o·wn role assignment remains client-centered, but his perception of
his opponent's role is changed from client-centered to court-centered, 8
the model becomes equivalent to a partly inquisitorial or "mixed"
system. This model is similar to the process employed in German
criminal courts, where the defense counsel is client-centered, but the
4. E. MORGAN, SOlllE PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
LmGATION 3 (1956); Barret, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37
NoTRE DAME LAw. 479, 481 (1962). While the attorney in a pure adversary system has
no counterpart in the ideal inquisitorial system, where the decision maker actively investigates the claims of unrepresented litigants, in practice inquisitorial systems have
made substantial use of attorneys in the production of evidence. See Lacy, supra note I,
at 75-82; Thibaut, Walker & Lind, supra note 2, at 388-89.
5. Freedman, Professional Responsibilities of the Civil Practitioner, in EouCATION
IN THE PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 151, 152 (D. ·weckstein ed. 1970).
6. The attorney's role is explained in Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent
his client zealously within the bounds of the law ••.•" ABA, CooE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Canon EC 7-1.
7. The traditional private financing arrangements are outlined in Canon 2 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The contingent fee, which is expressly allowed by
Canon EC 2-20, probably provides the strongest reinforcement of the role assignment.
8. This change can be made by informing one attorney that his opponent's first
responsibility is to assist the court in producing a just result and that his opponent's
outcome will be determined by the court based on his performance.
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prosecutor is less of an advocate for the state than in the AngloAmerican adversary system. 9 If the attorney's perception of his own
role is also changed to court-centered, the new model becomes still
more inquisitorial and antithetical to the adversary system and its
claimed advantage. This model is similar to the Soviet criminal system, where the primary duty of both attorneys seems to be assisting
the court in reaching a just result. 10
In order to evaluate fully the advantage claimed for the adversary
model we sought to add a third element that would test the hypothesis under a variety of conditions. The degree to which the evidence
discovered in a case favors one party at the expense of another appeared to meet this criterion. This fact-distribution element is a pervasive condition of legal conflict resolution that, intuition suggests,
may significantly influence information search and transmission. Further, this variable could be easily and accurately controlled by regulating the flow of favorable information acquired by the subjects
during the experiment.
The remainder of this article reports a laboratory experiment intended to cast light on both the specific claim made on behalf of the
adversary system and the nature of information processing in legal
systems generally.
II.

METHOD

A. Procedure

The one hundred and four first-year law students participating
in the experiment were told to act as attorneys in a criminal case.11
9. The role of the West German defense counsel is described in BRAO § I, Schonfelder, Deutsche Gesetze (C.H. Beck 1969). See also K. PETERS, STRAFPROZESS 182-83 (2d
ed. 1966). The prosecutor's role is illustrated in STPO § 160(2), Schonfelder, Deutsche
Gesetze (C.H. Beck 1970). See also K. PETERS, supra, at 139; Schweichel, Die Zukunft der
Staatsanwaltschaft, 1970 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR REcHTSPOLmK 171-74.
IO. The role of the Soviet defense attorney is described in R. CONQUEST, JusncE AND
THE LEGAL SYsrEM IN THE U.S.S.R. 32-39 (1968) and Comment, The Role of Defense
Counsel in Soviet Criminal Proceedings, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 806. The prosecutor's role is
described in R. CONQUEST, supra, at 40-46.
II. The case was lHitten to turn on the single issue of whether the defendant's
violent response to an assault was justified. The case was described to the law students
by a brief summary which stated that Adams and Zemp had been close friends for
years. The two friends had begun to gamble heavily together and eventually met at a
tavern to discuss their now involved relationship. After a period of conversation, Zemp
knocked Adams to the floor and threw an object in his direction. Adams responded by
stabbing Zemp in the stomach with a piece of glass. The summary concluded with the
statement of a self-defense rule: "The law provides that it is unlawful to use more
force in repelling an attack than a person believes necessary, or than a reasonable
person would believe necessary in the same or similar circumstances." Additional facts
about the case were created for use in the development and presentation task, and
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It was explained that there would be two phases to the task: The
first phase would consist of an investigation; the second would comprise the transmission of facts to the trier. 12 The investigation involved purchasing facts from the experimenter. The students were
given five opportunities to purchase as many or as few facts as they
wished. Any purchase required a specified expenditure of points,
which the students were instructed to maximize. 13 The expenditure
of points was intended to be analogous to the expenditure of time
and effort by an attorney in an actual investigation.14
The second phase of the experiment began as soon as both attorneys had completed all five fact-buying opportunities. During this
phase the attorneys selected the facts that they wished to transmit
to the trier of fact. When both attorneys had decided which facts
they wished to present, a post-experimental questionnaire was administered to assess their perceptions of the experimental situation.lli
B.

Experimental Manipulations

Three factors were systematically varied within the experimental
situation described above. Before they began the investigation phase,
half of the students were given client-centered role instructions, while
the remaining half were given court-centered role instructions. Attorneys who received client-centered role instructions were told that
they were to advance the interests of one of the parties and that
their own monetary outcomes in the experiment were partially contingent upon a favorable verdict. In contrast, the court-centered role
instructions told the attorneys to help the judge arrive at "as fair and
accurate a decision as possible." Attorneys who received court-cenprior to the experiment these facts were scaled by eight law students according to the
degree to which they were favorable to either Adams or Zemp. The Thurstone method
of equal-appearing intervals was used. See L. THURSI"ONE, THE MEASUREMENT OF VALUES
67-81 (1959). The case was very similar to that used in the two prior studies briefly
described in the text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra.
12. The law students participated in the experiment two at a time. During the
entire experiment they were separated in cubicles, and hence neither had knowledge of
the specific actions of the other.
13. The students were led to believe that their monetary outcomes would be par•
tially determined by the number of points they had at the end of the task.
14. The cost of the facts followed a positively accelerated function so that the more
facts the law student purchased the greater was the cost of each new fact, just as the
discovery of facts at hand is presumably less costly to an attorney than the later
discovery of more remote facts.
15. The questionnaire asked for ratings on seven-point Likert-type scales concerning
reactions to the experimental situation. For example, the law students were asked to
rate their own and their opponents' actions on a number of dimensions including
cooperativeness, fairness, and peacefulness.
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tered roles were instructed that their monetary outcomes in the
experiment were not dependent upon the result in the case.
The second factor varied in the experiment was the attorneys'
perceptions of the role of the other attorney in the legal system. Half
of the law students given client-centered instructions were told the
other attorney had also received client-centered role instructions; half
were told the other had received court-centered role instructions.16
The same procedure was repeated with the law students receiving
court-centered role instructions. Thus, client-centered attorneys opposed client-centered opponents (the adversary situation), client-centered attorneys confronted court-centered opponents (the "mixed"
legal system as seen by its adversary members), court-centered attorneys faced client-centered opponents (the "mixed" system as seen
by its inquisitorial members), and court-centered attorneys were
paired with court-centered opponents (the inquisitorial system).
The experiment was designed to permit control over a third factor-the percentage of favorable facts discovered by attorneys during
their investigations. As the attorneys purchased facts they might find
that 25 per cent, 50 per cent, or 75 per cent of the facts advanced
their clients' interests.17

III.

RESULTS

A. Perception of the Experimental Situation
The answers to several questions on the post-experimental questionnaire provided assurance that the attorneys were perceiving the
experimental manipulations as intended. 18 Statistical analyses of responses to these questions revealed that attorneys who received client16. In fact, the purported vis-a-vis was not always physically present. This was
necessary in order to allow random assignment of individuals to experimental conditions, which, in turn, is necessary to allow examination of individual behavior.
17. When the attorney had received court-centered instructions and was in a mixed
system (i.e., with a client-centered vis-a-vis), the percentage of favorable facts was
defined as the proportion of facts unfavorable to the contentions of the client-centered
other. For court-centered attorneys with court-centered others it was necessary to arbitrarily define the percentage of "favorable facts" as the proportion of facts favorable
to one of the parties.
18. The significance of the results reported in this section, including ratings on
the questionnaire and behavior in the experiment, was assessed by the appropriate
multivariate or univariate analysis of variance technique. A difference between two
experimental conditions is tested for statistical significance by comparing the magnitude
of the difference to the variation within each condition. The difference is said to be
"significant" if it would occur less than five times out of a hundred by chance alone
{I\Titten as p < .05). Smaller values of "p" provide greater assurance that the difference
was not the result of chance. Only those differences that are reported to be significant
should be regarded as "true" or real differences.
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centered instructions saw their own actions as less cooperative (p
< .001), less fair (p < .002), less peaceful (p < .004), less likeable
(p < .01), and more biased (p < .001) than did attorneys who received court-centered instructions. These results verify that the clientcentered attorneys were indeed more contentious or adversarial in
their approach to the case. The attorneys' views of their opponents'
behavior similarly suggested an effective manipulation of their perceptions of the other. Attorneys who were assigned client-centered
opponents rated the other attorney as less cooperative (p < .001), less
peaceful (p < .004), less likeable (p < .005), and more biased (p <
.00 I) than did those facing court-centered attorneys.
The degree to which the attorneys were aware of the distribution
of favorable facts was assessed by a question asking them to estimate
the distribution of favorable £acts from the total population of facts
about the case. Responses to this question corresponded quite closely
to the experimentally manipulated percentage of favorable facts. 19

B. Diligence of Investigation
The willingness of attorneys to purchase facts from the experimenter served as an index of the diligence of investigation engendered by the various experimental conditions. The average number
of facts bought by attorneys in each of the conditions is presented
in Table I. Analyses of these results revealed no statistically signifiTABLE 1
AVERAGE NUMBER OF FACI'S PURCHASED BY INDIVIDUAL ATTORNEYS

Percentage of Facts Favorable to Attorney
25%
Opponent's Role

50%
Opponent's Role

75%
Opponent's Role

Attorney's
Role

Court

Client

Court

Client

Court

Client

Court
Client

19.0 (8)a
24.5 (8)

21.5 (8)
27.5 (8)

21.6 (10)
22.4 (10)

23.6 (10)
19.6 (10)

23.5 (8)
19.5 (8)

22.5 (8)
17.0 (8)

a Number of law students in each category is indicated in parentheses.

cant differences in information search between client-centered attorneys and court-centered attorneys when the distribution of £acts was
50 per cent or 75 per cent favorable (p > .10). When only 25 per cent
19. The mean estimates of the percentage of favorable facts in the total population
of facts were 31.1%, 51.7%, and 69.5% respectively, in the 25%, 50%, and 75% favor•
able conditions.
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of the discovered evidence was favorable, however, client-centered
attorneys purchased significantly more facts than did court-centered
attorneys (p < .033).
C.

Presentation of Evidence

Attorney bias in the presentation of discovered evidence is described by an index constructed to reflect the degree to which the
attorneys did not transmit to the trier the same distribution of facts
they received. The closer an index value is to +LOO, the more the
attorney biased his presentation by transmitting a higher proportion
of favorable facts than was present in the facts he discovered. Values
close to zero indicate that the attorney transmitted approximately
the same distribution of facts he discovered. The average values of
this index in each of the conditions is reported in Table 2.20 InspecTABLE 2
PRESENTATION BIASING INDEX FOR INDIVIDUAL ATIORNEYS

Percentage of Facts Favorable to Attorney
25%
Opponent's Role

50%
Opponent's Role

75%
Opponent's Role

Attorney's
Role

Court

Client

Court

Client

Court

Client

Court
Client

.023 (8)R
.948 (8)

.010 (8)
.812 (8)

.013 (10)
.969 (10)

.063 (10)
.883 (10)

.007 (8)
.941 (8)

.147 (8)
.857 (8)

a Number of law students in each category is indicated in parentheses.

tion of Table 2 reveals two statistically significant differences in the
presentations of attorneys in the various experimental conditions.
First, as might be expected, the values of the index were relatively
high when the attorney's own role was client-centered and relatively
low when the attorney's own role was court-centered. (p < .001).
Client-centered attorneys transmitted almost no evidence contrary to
their clients' interests, while court-centered attorneys transmitted virtually the same distribution of facts they received during the investigation.
Second, although the values of the index are quite high for all
client-centered attorneys, the average value was lower when a client20. The index reported in Table 2 reflects the amount that the manipulated distribution changed in transmission relative to the amount of change possible. The
results are essentially the same when the absolute amount of transmission change is
used.
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centered attorney confronted a client-centered opponent rather than
a court-centered opponent (p < .03).
This effect is evident from the values presented in the bottom
row of Table 2. Apparently, when the opponent was client-centered,
the attorney transmitted more facts that were unfavorable to his own
client (according to the impartial scaling of facts)-a somewhat unexpected finding.21
·
The importance of these individual results is emphasized when
arranged to show the effects of the varied roles and fact distributions
upon all the information reaching the judge from both attorneys.
These effects were assessed by matching in pairs the subjects whose
joint role structures represented adversary, mixed, and inquisitorial
legal systems.22 Adversary pairs consisted of two opposing clientcentered attorneys, mixed pairs consisted of one client-centered and
one court-centered attorney, and inquisitorial pairs consisted of two
court-centered attorneys. In each pair, the attorney matched the description of the other's vis-a-vis and discovered from the same pool of
facts. The distribution of facts discovered by the pair is indicated by
the numbers following the name of the system. For adversary and
inquisitorial pairs the balanced fact distribution is indicated by
"50%-50%," and the uneven fact distribution by "25%-75%." The
distribution of facts received by mixed pairs is designated by "50%50%" for the balanced case, "25%-75%" for an unbalanced case unfavorable to the client-centered attorney, and "75%-25%" for an un•
balanced case favorable to the client-centered attomey. 23
21. A possible explanation for this effect may be advanced on the basis of social
psychological research by Pepitone who found that individuals highly motivated in
their attempts to achieve a desired goal tended to distort in a favorable direction any
factors that might facilitate goal attainment. Pepitone, Motivational Effects in Social
Perception, 3 HUMAN RELATIONS 57 (1950). Similarly, client-centered attorneys in this
experiment may have been most highly motivated to work for a favorable verdict
when they were actively opposed by client-centered opponents. If this was the case,
these attorneys may have overestimated their ability to achieve the desired verdict by
misinterpreting some of the unfavorable facts to render them favorable to their own
clients. The transmission of these facts in the mistaken belief they were favorable could
have caused the observed decrease in the objective index. There is some evidence from
the questionnaire data that supports this explanation. A significant correlation was
found between the transmission-biasing index and estimates of the over-all proportion
of favorable facts. In this case the correlation revealed that attorneys who overestimated
the over-all proportion of favorable facts tended also, to a degree greater than would
be expected from chance, to transmit a lower proportion of favorable facts. This would
be expected from the reinterpretation explanation since the reinterpretation of some
unfavorable facts would result in lower values of the transmission biasing index and
higher estimates of the over-all proportion of favorable facts. The value of the correlation was - .60.
22. The composition of the pairs was necessary because of the procedure described
in note 16 supra.
23. The seven possible pair situations are listed on the top row of Table 3.
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TABLE 3
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PRESENTATION CHARACTERISTICS OF UGAL SYSTEMS IN THE EXPERIMENT

~

Legal System and Percentage of Facts Favorable to the Attorneys
Inquisitorial
50%-50%
Presentation Biasing Index For Pairs
Number of Unique Facts Presented by Pairs

.024 (5)n
19.80

Mixed
50%-50%
.103 (10)
20.30

Adversary
50%-50%

Inquisitorial
25%•75%

Mixed
25%·75%

Mixed
75%-25%

Adversary
25%-75%

.041 (5)
18.80

.017 (8)
19.88

.132 (8)
20.25

.084 (8)
19.25

.ll4 (8)
18.13

n Number of pairs of law students in each category is indicated in parentheses.

~
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§
~

.....
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Table 3 presents average values for two characteristics of the pairs'
presentation of evidence to the trier. The first row reports the alteration or biasing in the pairs' transmissions of the discovered distribution of information. That is, values of this index greater than zero
indicate that the distribution of facts the pair presented to the judge
differed from the distribution discovered during the investigation.
Analysis of this index revealed distinct patterns of alteration for each
of the three legal systems. As may be seen from the table, the average
values of the index were relatively high for mixed pairs regardless of
the distribution of facts discovered by these pairs. Inspection of the
presentations upon which this distortion index was based revealed
that the biasing of the fact distribution consistently favored the clientcentered attorney; the information that mixed pairs transmitted to
the judge contained a higher proportion of facts favorable to the
claims of the party represented by the client-centered attorney than
was present in the original, experimentally controlled distribution
of evidence. Inquisitorial pairs, in contrast, almost perfectly reflected
the distribution they discovered, as indicated by the relatively low
average values of the index for these pairs. Again, the original distribution of facts did not affect the degree of biasing.
Adversary role structures produced more complex effects upon
the distribution of facts reaching the trier than did inquisitorial and
mixed role structures. When the original distribution of evidence
was balanced, the presentations of adversary pairs, like the transmissions of inquisitorial pairs, almost perfectly reflected the original distribution, indicated by the relatively low average values in the top
row of Table 3, for both adversary 50%-50% and inquisitorial 50%50% pairs. However, when the original distribution of facts was
uneven, adversary pairs did not present the same distribution of
evidence they discovered, as may be seen from the high average value
of the biasing index (.114) for adversary 25%-75% pairs. In this case,
inspection of the transmissions revealed that adversary pairs with uneven original fact distributions altered the distribution to render
them more favorable to the attorney whose contentions were least
supported by the original distribution of evidence.
In summary, inquisitorial pairs presented to the trier approximately the same distribution of facts they discovered: If the distribution discovered was 50%-50%, the distribution presented was
about 50%-50%; if the original distribution was 25%-75%, the dis-

May 1973)

Discovery of Evidence

1139

tribution presented was 25%-75%. Mixed pairs consistently biased
the evidence distribution in favor of the party represented by a clientcentered attorney: If the original distribution was 50%-50%, the distribution presented was 60%-40%,24 if the original distribution was
25%-75%, the presented distribution was approximately 33%-67%,
and if the original distribution was 75%-25%, the presented distribution was 88%-12%. Adversary pairs altered the evidence distribution only when one party was disadvantaged, and always in favor of
that party. Thus, if the original distribution was 50%-50%, the presented distribution was also approximately 50%-50%, but if the
original distribution was 25%-75%, the presented evidence distribution was about 36%-64%.25
The second row of numbers in Table 3 reports the number of
unique facts in the presentations by pairs of attorneys. 26 Statistical
analysis of these data revealed no reliable differences between any of
the seven possible combinations of legal systems and original evidence distributions (p < .50).
D. Perception of the Legal Situation
In addition to assessing the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulations, the responses to the post-experimental questionnaire
also provided data on the attorneys' psychological reactions to the
various conditions created within the experiment. The responses to
one question-asking for ratings of the "fairness" of the other attorney's actions-showed a particularly interesting, but rather complex pattern. When the distribution of facts was balanced (p < .01)
or unfavorable to their opponent (p < .05), court-centered attorneys
rated the actions of client-centered opponents to be less fair than the
actions of court-centered opponents. However, when the distribution
was favorable to the opponent (i.e., when 75 per cent of the facts
favored the opponent's contentions and only 25 per cent of the facts
were unfavorable to his position), no difference in the ratings of
client-centered and court-centered opposing attorneys was detected.
24. The first percentage represents the proportion of evidence favorable to the
client-centered attorney.
25. This perspective of the results was developed independently of the biasing
index by direct examination of the distributions of evidence presented by pairs in the
various conditions. Since these values were generated from the same data used to
compute the biasing index, the meaning of the results is substantially the same.
26. Each fact was counted only once, whether it was presented by one or both
attorneys.

1140

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1129

Apparently court-centered attorneys, constrained to nonadversary
presentation of evidence, felt that partisan advocacy by the other attorney was unfair if the evidence discovered did not obviously support the other's position. But when the discovered distribution of
evidence actually supported the position advocated by the other
attorney, the advocacy was congruent with the court-centered attorney's own opinion and apparently was not seen as unfair.
Client-centered attorneys perceived the actions of client-centered
others as less fair than the actions of court-centered others only when
the discovered distribution of facts was unfavorable to the attorney
himself (p < .01). There was no difference in the fairness ratings of
client-centered others and court-centered others when the attorney
himself was client-centered and the distribution of facts was balanced
or favorable. The actions of the other attorney, then, were seen as
relatively unfair by client-centered attorneys when both the distribution of evidence and the contentions of the other opposed the attorney's position. Attorneys in this unpleasant situation may have
felt that there was little need for the other to behave in an adversary
manner, even though he had been assigned such a role. 27

IV.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study suggest that the characteristics of legal
systems may be quite different from the characteristics legal theorists
have postulated, at least with regard to the discovery and presentation of evidence. For example, implicit in the statement that in an
adversary role structure "the likelihood is maximized that all relevant facts will be ferreted out ..." 28 is the assumption that clientcentered attorneys are generally more diligent in their investigation
of a case. But no pervasive difference due to the attorney's role was
observed in the information-search phase of this experiment. Only
when the distribution of facts was unfavorable to the client-centered
27. The experimental analogs of the adversary, mixed, and inquisitorial systems
created within the context of this study were "pure" or ideal examples of the situations produced by various combinations of attorney roles. It is necessary that the reader,
in contemplating the results of the study and the discussion of these results, remember that the application of these findings to particular real legal systems is dependent
not only upon the usual constraints of scientific generalization, but also upon the
extent to which the real system in question approaches in its characteristics the relevant "pure" example.
28. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
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attorneys did these attorneys seek more information than court-centered attorneys.
The fact-search differences noted above may be explained by
considering the information requirements of attorneys in the different experimental conditions.29 Facts were useful to court-centered attorneys to the extent the facts aided them in forming a stable belief
about the case. Court-centered attorneys, with their interest in a fair
and just decision, could be expected to cease their fact search as soon
as they became confident of their assessment of the legal conflict. For
client-centered attorneys, in contrast, the major utility of the facts
lay in obtaining a favorable verdict. Thus, it is not surprising that
the discovered fact distribution affected the information search of
client-centered attorneys more than it affected the information search
of court-centered attorneys. It appears that client-centered attorneys
who found the initial distribution of facts to be favorable or balanced were content to cease their investigation relatively early (i.e.,
at about the same point as court-centered attorneys). When the distribution of evidence was obviously unfavorable to the client-centered attorney, however, the utility of any available favorable facts
was especially high. Only by continuing their investigations long
enough to acquire a relatively large supply of favorable facts could
client-centered attorneys with difficult cases hope to win a verdict.30
As will be seen below, the relatively extensive investigation engendered by the combination of a client-centered role and an unfavorable distribution of facts produced the major distinctive feature of
information presentation by adversary legal systems.
It was noted earlier that, contrary to the assumption of adversary
system theorists, no reliable differences were obtained in the number
of unique facts attorneys transmitted to the legal decision maker in
the experimental analogs of inquisitorial, mixed, and adversary legal
systems. But each legal system exerted a distinctive efject upon the
distribution of evidence presented to the decision maker. The distribution of the facts presented to the trier by inquisitorial pairs was
29. This explanation is based primarily upon a theoretical analysis by Kelley and
Thibaut of the processes involved in group problem solving, of which the legal
situation is a special case. See Kelley &: Thibaut, Group Problem Solving, in 4 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY I (2d ed. G. Lindzey &: E. Aronson 1969).

30. More extensive search for information when the information is presumed to
have high utility has been found in previous studies. See Canon, Self-Confidence and
Selective Exposure to Information, in CoNFucr, DECISION AND DISSONANCE 83 (L.
Festinger ed. 1964) and Freedman, Confidence, Utility, and Selective Exposure: A
Partial Replication, 2 J. PERSONALITY&: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778 (1965).
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virtually identical to the distribution discovered by the attorneys,
regardless of the nature of the original distribution. The outstanding
characteristic of inquisitorial systems, then, is the lack of any change
in the distribution of facts during discovery and transmission by the
attorneys. Such "unbiased" presentation may, of course, create problems. If, for some reason, the evidentiary distribution discovered by
the attorneys is not representative of the "true" or total distribution
of all evidence, the inaccuracy will be retained in the attorneys' presentation. In other words, the inquisitorial model does not systematically compensate for "sampling error." 31
The presentations by mixed pairs of attorneys showed consistent
bias in favor of the party who was represented by the client-centered
attorney. 32 This bias probably resulted from the transmission of all
available favorable facts by the client-centered attorneys and the
transmission of only some of the available facts unfavorable to the
client-centered attorney by court-centered attorneys. The mixed system appears to serve best when conditions require a consistent decision-making bias in favor of one party to the legal conflict. For example, if public policy demands that a constant advantage be given
the defendant in criminal proceedings regardless of the apparent
distribution of evidence, the use of a mixed-role structure and the
designation of the client-centered attorney as defense counsel may
best realize the principle.
Equally reliable, but more complex, was the biasing pattern of
adversary pairs. When the original evidentiary distribution was balanced, no biasing of the distribution was observed. When the original distribution was uneven, however, the adversary role structure
resulted in a bias favoring the party whose contentions were least
supported by the initial distribution of evidence. This "conditional"
bias in the presentations of adversary pairs appears to be caused by
31. The term "sampling error," as used here, refers to the possibility that the
distribution of discovered evidence is not identical, for some reason irrelevant to the
basic legal question, to the distribution of all evidence about the case. Sampling error
is a major concern of statistical decision theory, which attempts to discriminate actual
differences in the distributions of scientific evidence from differences occurring by
chance. See G. FERGUSON, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 135-37,
144-46 (1966); R. YOUNG & D. VELDMAN, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 109-11 (1965).
32. The distribution of evidence in the presentations of these pairs was approximately 10% more favorable to the client-centered attorney than was the original,
discovered distribution-an effect that was observed in all tested initial distributions
See text accompanying note 25 supra.
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the more diligent investigation of adversary attorneys who were confronted with unfavorable fact distributions. By accumulating and
then presenting a relatively large number of favorable facts, these
attorneys were able to render the distribution presented by their pair
more favorable to their own clients' interests. Therefore, the adversary role structure seems most congruent with a public policy requiring overwhelming proof before a verdict can be rendered. In contrast to the inquisitorial model, the adversary system systematically
compensates for possible sampling error.33 The presentation bias evident with adversary systems serves to decrease the impact of any deviations in the discovered distribution of evidence from the "true"
or total distribution. Thus, one important function of the adversary
system may be to eliminate chance differences in the distribution of
favorable evidence.
V.

CONCLUSION

This experiment suggests several important conclusions about information processing in an adversary system. First, the adversary system apparently does not provoke a generally more vigorous search
for facts, but does instigate significantly more thorough investigation
by advocates initially confronted with plainly unfavorable evidence.
Thus, the claimed general investigatory advantage for the system appears to be limited, but limited to situations of great social and humanitarian concern. Second, the total number of unique facts presented to the fact finder is apparently not greater in an adversary
system than in the ideal alternative systems. However, this study
identified a major, and heretofore unsuspected, effect of adversary
decision making: The model introduces a systematic evidentiary bias
in favor of the party disadvantaged by the discovered facts. In a criminal case this process may work to the advantage of the prosecution
or the defense; the distortion introduced is in favor of the underdog,
regardless of identity.34 This characteristic of an adversary system
stands in significant contrast to a mixed system of decision making,
which introduces a systematic bias in favor of the party represented
by an advocate (typically a criminal defendant), and to the inquisitorial system, which apparently introduces no distortion in the pre33. However, there is a cost associated with this protection. If the discovered distribution is an accurate representation of all the facts about the case, the full
strength of the favored party's claim will not be evident.
34. It seems likely that the same effect would occur in civil litigation.
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sented facts. This systematic effect of the adversary system on the
factual basis for decision is a product that must be given careful consideration in any general evaluation of the quality of the adversary
system.

